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Abstract++
This master’s thesis investigates the relationship between inequality and democracy level. The 
research question investigated is, does inequality affect democracy? I conclude from previous 
literature that there is little consensus on if there is a relationship between inequality and 
democracy, the most widely known theories are therefore all tested in this thesis. I furthermore 
conclude that there is criticism towards the most used measurements of inequality and I 
therefore test an alternative operationalization of inequality. Furthermore, is the aspect of the 
affect of inequality over time missing in the literature and therefore tested in my thesis. I chose 
a quantitative research design and use a time series cross section regression model to test the 
affect of inequality on democracy level. My results show no support for the established theories. 
I however find that some of the alternative operationalization’s of inequality produces results 
in the predicted way of the established theories.  My results also indicate that inequality has a 
changing effect on democracy level over time.  
 
 
 
Key words: democracy, inequality 
+
+
+
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3"
Table+of+content+
1+ Introduction+ 4+
2+ Literature+review+ 5+
2.1+ Several*contradicting*findings* 6+
2.2+ Problems*in*measuring*inequality* 10+
2.3+ The*effect*of*inequality*over*time* 11+
2.4+ Conclusions*from*the*literature*review* 12+
3+ Purposes+and+problem+formulation+ 12+
4+ Theory+and+hypothesizes+ 13+
4.1+ Main*previous*theoretical*arguments*on*why*inequality*effect*democracy* 13+
4.2+ An*alternative*theoretical*framework* 15+
4.2.1+ Particularistic*or*public*goods*spending*in*budget*and*means*tested*or*universal*welfare*
systems+ 17+
4.2.2+ Educational*inequality+ 18+
4.2.3+ Health*inequality+ 18+
4.2.4+ Power*distributed*by*socioeconomic*group*and*social*group+ 19+
4.2.5+ Power*distributed*by*gender+ 20+
5+ Research+design+ 20+
5.1+ Operationalization*and*data* 21+
5.1.1+ Dependent*variable+ 21+
5.1.2+ Independent*variables+ 22+
5.1.3+ Control*variables+ 27+
5.2+ Estimation*strategy* 29+
5.3+ Delimitations* 30+
6+ Analysis+and+results+ 31+
6.1+ Gini*and*Land*inequality*effect*on*democracy*level* 32+
6.2+ The*alternative*operationalization*of*inequality* 35+
6.3+ Effect*sizes* 39+
6.4+ Analysis*of*the*effect*over*time* 40+
7+ Conclusions,+concerns+and+suggestions+for+further+research+ 51+
7.1+ Conclusions*on*the*different*purposes* 51+
7.2+ Concerns* 54+
7.3+ Suggestions*for*further*research* 55+
7.4+ Concluding*remarks* 55+
8+ References+ 57+
Appendix+A+ 60+
Appendix+B+ 62+
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
" 4"
 
1! Introduction+
Why do some countries democratize? One of the more established theories on democratization 
is the theory which links inequality levels to democracy. The theory broadly says that as the 
general population becomes relatively poorer, due to larger inequality, this will lead to an 
increased want for redistribution by the population. The cost for the elite to repress the 
population will be lower than what they would lose in a democratic system and the country 
therefore remains autocratic.  In a more equal society however, the cost for repression would 
be higher than the cost for redistribution and an equal society is therefore more democratic 
(Boix 2003).  
After a literature review I conclude that while this theory may sound simple and 
easy to test empirically, this has not been the case.  I argue that this relationship need further 
investigation and the research question for my thesis is therefore: does inequality affect 
democracy?  
I find the relationship between inequality and democracy interesting to investigate 
since previous literature has come to completely different results on whether there is a 
relationship between inequality and democratization, and what such a relationship then looks 
like. Furthermore, numerous studies point to the difficulty of measuring inequality and the poor 
quality of this measurement that many datasets have. This poor quality of the inequality 
measurement could lead to poor or misleading results on the effects of inequality.  
Based on the issues in the previous literature I formulate three purposes of my 
master’s thesis. I will in this master’s thesis first test the main competing theories on the 
relationship between inequality and democracy. Second, I will introduce an alternative 
measurement of inequality. Finally, I will investigate the inequality affect on the democracy 
level over time, an aspect that is missing in the previous literature.  
I can contribute to the research field by achieving these purposes, both by 
introducing a new take on inequality’s changing effects over time and by potentially introducing 
an alternative measurement of inequality. The introduction of an alternative measurement of 
inequality that has wider coverage could contribute to making it easier for researchers of 
different fields to investigate the effects and causes of inequality.  
The external contributions of my master’s thesis mainly come in the form of 
understanding democratization. By using the results of my master’s thesis new ideas on how to 
promote democracy or prevent a decrease of democracy levels might be formulated. The 
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introduction of an alternative measurement of inequality could as well benefit external actors 
by making it easier to evaluate the effect of inequality.  
The outline of the rest of my thesis is as follows: I begin with a review of the 
previous literature on the relationship between inequality and democracy. I then state the 
purpose and problem formulation of my master’s thesis. This is followed by a theory chapter, 
which also includes my hypotheses. I then present the research design of my study; this chapter 
includes the operationalization of my main variables and the estimation strategy. The research 
design chapter is followed by a presentation of my results and analysis. Finally, I present the 
conclusions drawn from my analysis and suggestions for further research.  
 
2! Literature+review+
What leads to democratization of a country? Researches have battled with this question for a 
long time and there are about as many answers and theories as there are political scientists. The 
broad democratization literature can be divided into four main approaches; 1) the structural 
approach (modernization theory), here the actors play little role and democratization is said to 
follow if there is a change in the environment, for example increased wealth  (Teorell 2010, p. 
17); 2) the strategic approach, here the actors play an important role and the choice to 
democratize is a strategic decision made by the actors (Teorell 2010, p. 19) ; 3) the social forces 
tradition, here social classes will ship democracy if this is in their interest (Teorell 2010, p. 22) 
and; 4) the economic approach where economic tools are used to explain democratization 
(Teorell 2010, p. 24). I will in this master’s thesis focus on this fourth approach to 
democratization, and more specifically, the literature within this approach that focuses on the 
relationship between inequality and democratization. I choose to focus on the approach because 
here both different actors and structures are thought to effect democracy. I therefore find this 
approach to be the most comprehensive approach.  
I have divided the section of previous literature on the relationship between 
inequality and democracy into three parts; the first section presents the different relationships 
which has been found between inequality and democracy. The second section present the 
problem of how inequality is measured and the data that this measurement is based on. The 
third section presents the issue of the literature not addressing the changing effects that 
inequality might have on democracy over time. This section ends with a short summary of the 
literature. 
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I conclude from the literature that there is little consensus on whether or not there 
is a relationship between inequality and democracy, and if there is, how a relationship might 
look like.  A summary table of the studies included can be found in Appendix A. I also conclude 
that several studies point out that data availability on the measurement of inequality is poor. I 
finally conclude that inequality is assumed to be slow changing and to have the same effect on 
democracy at different points in time (Bollen and Jackman, 1985).  
 
2.1!Several+contradicting+findings+
I have found several contradicting theories and findings on the relationship between inequality 
and democracy. There is in the research field little consensus on 1) whether there is a 
relationship between inequality and democracy and 2) how such a relationship then might look 
like. I first present the studies that have found no relationship between inequality and 
democracy. I then present papers that has found a negative relationship between high inequality 
and democracy. Finally, I present studies that has found the relationship to be more complex.  
Several papers in the field argue that there is no relationship between inequality 
and democracy. If a relationship has been found is this according to Bollen and Jackman (1985) 
most likely due to either problem with a confounding variable, the data or a causal directional 
problem. In their paper from 1985, Bollen and Jackman questions the relationship between 
democracy and economic inequality. They argue that previous empirical studies have suffered 
from problems such as failure to see the bidirectional link between democracy and inequality; 
and that the relationship might not be linear.  According to Bollen and Jackman (1985), no 
relationship can be found.  
Muller (1988) also ague that a relationship between inequality and democracy 
might be in the reverse direction. Muller tests if countries that has lower inequality are more 
likely to democratize and find no support for this claim. However, Muller (1988) find a 
relationship between the stability of democracies and high inequality, where countries with 
higher inequality are more likely to break down after democratization. 
On the same theme, Houle (2009) find that inequality harms democratic 
consolidation but has no effect on democratization. Houle states that his study is the first to test 
both theories on democratization and democratic consolidation at the same time. Furthermore, 
Houle (2009) argues that there are several problems with the theories linking inequality to a 
democratic transition since they all fail to account for collective action problems. Houle has a 
problem with the established theories on democratization assuming that a will for 
democratization always originates from below. However, are theories of the link between 
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inequality and consolidation of democracy more flexible. Houle (2009) use a dynamic probit 
analysis and find no relationship between inequality and democratic transition. 
Teorell (2010) is another author who finds no relation between inequality and 
democracy. He investigates the third wave of democratization and tests various theories of what 
can explain democratization, inequality being one of them (Teorell 2010, p. 16ff). Teorell 
(2010, p.8) finds that low inequality does not lead to democracy. Teorell (2010, p. 60) uses the 
Gini coefficient1 as a measurement of inequality and finds no effect either in the long-run or 
when using different model specifications. 
A more recent study by Haggard and Kaufman (2012) also finds there to be no 
relationship between inequality and democratic transition. Their study examines the third wave 
of democratization between 1980-2000, mainly in post-socialist countries. Haggard and 
Kaufman (2012) use an an alternative method compared to all other studies, a causal process 
observation method.  By using this method can they investigate the causal process that has led 
countries to democratize. They find that transition to democracy happens in countries with all 
levels of inequality and therefore claim that there is no causal link between inequality and 
democracy.  
Another common finding in the field of research on the link between inequality 
and democracy is that high inequality is associated with no democratization or low levels of 
democracy. Muller (1995:a) argues that high levels of income inequality leads to an unstable 
democratic development. Muller (1995:a) furthermore argues that there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between high income inequality and economic development. The results are 
confirmed in Muller (1995:b) but have been criticized for not using a continuous measurement 
of democracy by Bollen and Jackman (1995).  
The Feng and Zak paper from 1999 is another study that test what affects 
transitions to democracy. Their findings are in line with their theory and they conclude that 
democratic transition is less likely when the development level is low and the inequality level 
is high, as well a lack of democratic heritage seems to hinder a democratic development. In a 
later paper Zak and Feng (2003) argue that the speed of the democratic transition also depends 
on the inequality level, where higher inequality levels slows down a speedy transition to 
democracy.  
                                                
1 The Gini coefficient is one of the most widely used measurements of economic inequality. 
For further details, see page 22 in this master’s thesis. 
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One of the most prominent authors on the relationship between inequality and 
democratization is Boix. He argues that there is a need to combine the economic, sociologic 
and game theoretical arguments to explain democratization of a country (Boix 2003, p. 10). 
Boix (ibid) predict that a more equal distribution in society promotes democracy. The argument 
made is that the pressure for redistribution from the poor decrease when a society becomes 
more equal. The costs for the elites will then go down since they do not have to pay that much 
in tax redistribution when equality is high. Boix (ibid) argues that the cost of redistribution in 
a democratic regime would then be smaller than the cost of repression that the rich would have 
to pay and a democratic regime is therefore chosen by the elite.  His empirical results show that 
both the probability of democratization and democratic consolidation increases with a more 
equal society. The same results can also be seen when an extended time period from 1850 is 
tested by Boix (2003).  
Ziblatt (2009) argues in favor of a negative relationship between income 
inequality and democratization. His paper is, unlike most of the other studies, a case study of 
Prussia in the beginning of the 20th century. Ziblatt (2009) investigates why Prussia remained 
autocratic during the first wave of democratization and theorizes that it might have to do with 
the level of inequality within the country. Ziblatt (2009) finds that members of parliament from 
constituencies with a high level of land inequality were more likely to vote against the suffrage 
bill. 
The third type of finding in the literature is a complex relationship between 
inequality and democracy. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Burkhart (1997) 
find a U-shaped relationship, while others find a relationship that depends on how inequality is 
operationalized (e.g. Ansell and Samuels (2010)).  
 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) theorizes that elite groups in a society with high 
inequality will repress the poor and not democratize due to the fear of redistribution in a 
democracy, largely the same mechanism described by Boix (2003). Additionally, Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006) theorizes that democratization is less likely in a society with a more equal 
income distribution since there then will be a lack of a demand for redistribution and thereby 
for democracy. In societies with moderate levels of inequality is democratization most likely 
since it is in these societies that the elites have to compromise by redistributing and 
democratizing. This theory creates an inverted U-shape relationship between inequality and 
probability of democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001 & 2006).     
 Burkhart (1997) investigate the effect that income distribution has on democracy 
in the period 1973-1988. Burkhart (1997) argues that the relationship is reciprocal and that 
9"
causality can go in both directions. Burkhart (1997) states that the reason that previous studies 
have failed to find a relationship between the two variables could have to do with the assumed 
linearity between the variables. Burkhart instead finds, just like Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006), an inverted U-shape relationship between income distribution and democracy. 
Ansell and Samuels (2010) propose and additionally more complex relationship 
between democracy and inequality. They argue in favor of a contractarian approach. This theory 
states that regime change is not an effect of the elites fear of the median voter. Instead, regime 
change is due to fear of expropriation, in groups with a rising economic wellbeing, from the 
governing elites. The conflict leading to democratization is therefore, according to Ansell and 
Samuels (2010), the intra elite conflict and not the elites conflict with the poor. Following from 
this line of argument comes that inequality should have different effects on democratization 
depending on which asset that is unequally distributed. Ansell and Samuels (2010) argues that 
land inequality has the same predictions as the ones presented by Boix (2003) and partly 
Acemoglu and Robinsson (2000, 2001 & 2006). High land inequality favors autocracy whilst 
low inequality leads to democracy. A difference in predictions comes with income inequality. 
Here Ansell and Samuels (2010) argue that a society is more likely to democratize when income 
inequality is higher. They build this argument on a historical review and argues that when 
income inequality is high, the rich people will fear expropriation by the political elite and the 
rich will therefore favor democracy to autocracy. Ansell and Samuels (2010) find support for 
their claims, both when measuring democracy as the dichotomous variable developed by Boix 
(2003) and when using the Polity scale2. 
Midlarsky (1992) use the same alternative operationalization of inequality, land 
inequality. He investigates the democratization of agrarian societies between 1973 and 1987. 
Midlarsky (1992) finds a relationship between land inequality and democracy, findings that 
suggest that to get a democratic process going is it necessary to initially have a high level of 
land equality. 
Perotti (1996) instead investigates the effect that inequality has on growth and 
reasons behind the relationship. Perotti finds that high inequality is associated with less political 
and social stability which then is connected to growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996) are in a 
similar study finding the same results, where higher income inequality leads to social discontent 
which then leads to socio-political instability. 
                                                
2 For explanation of the Polity scale see page 20 in this master’s thesis.  
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Dutt and Mitra (2008) builds on the Alesina and Perotti (1996) paper regarding 
the relationship between economic inequality and political stability. They however measure 
political stability as shifts between dictatorship and democracy, which they argue is missing in 
the Alesina and Parotti (1996) measurement. The results from Dutt and Mitra (2008) show that 
a more unequal society tend to move in and out of democracy, political volatility is furthermore 
found to lead to policy volatility which then effects output volatility, economic growth and 
investments.  
Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) is one of the more resent paper on the relationship 
between inequality and democracy.  They investigate one of the fundamental assumptions that 
both the Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 2006) and the Boix (2003) theories builds 
on, the difference in redistribution preference between the rich and the poor. Rueda and 
Stegmueller (2016) argues that the difference in redistribution preference between rich and poor 
does to some extent depend on the relative income, but for the rich does the preference also 
depend on the level of inequality. Rich people prefer more redistribution when the general level 
of inequality is high since they fear crime. The result from the Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) 
study suggests that the models by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 2006) and the Boix 
(2003) needs to be revised. 
To sum up, the literature presents a number of contradicting results, theories and 
methods. There is little, if any consensus on the relationship between inequality and democracy. 
This poses a problem to the research filed since we then cannot get a clear picture of whether 
inequality cause democratization. 
 
2.2!Problems+in+measuring+inequality++
The literature review also shows that there are concerns that could be raised with the data used, 
particularly when measuring the inequality variable.  
Several studies points to the problems with one of the most used datasets on 
economic inequality: the Deininger and Squire data from 1996. Data from Deininger and Squire 
has been used in the book by Boix (2003) and in a number of other papers, for example Feng 
and Zak (1999) and Barro (1999). It could be argued that their results suffer due to a lack of 
representatively in the data. Houle (2009) claim that the Deininger and Squire data only cover 
11% of the country years, a sample that is far from representative. Muller (1988) suffers from 
the same issues of validity since the sample tested only consists of 23 countries. 
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Houle (2009) suggest to instead uses data by Ortega and Rodriguez (2008) where 
around 65% of the country years are covered. This is a large increase in representation but it 
can still be questioned if this is enough coverage. Teorell (2010, p. 166) present an alternative 
data by Galbrait and Kum, from 2003, which Teorell argues has a wider coverage than the 
Deininger and Squire data.  
Further attempts to enhance the measurement of inequality has been made by 
Haggard and Kaufman (2012) who measure inequality by using three measurements. They use 
the Houles (2009) measurement of share of income in the manufacturing sector, the Vanhanen 
(2003) measure of land inequality and a Gini coefficient from University of Texas Inequality 
Projects Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) dataset from 2008. 
An alternative method to deal with the lack of data/the quality of data is to do case 
studies, see for example Ziblatt (2009) who investigate the relationship between inequality and 
democracy by looking at the vote on suffrage in the 1912 Prussian parliament. Problems with 
the method of case studies are the lack of generalizability from the results.  
All in all, I find it clear from the literature review that there is a problem when it 
comes to measuring inequality. Even when new, better datasets are used is the coverage of 
country-years 65%. There is furthermore a limited way of operationalizing inequality where the 
Gini coefficient, land or income quintiles are the dominating measurement, little attention has 
been paid to other types of inequality or to try to develop alternative measurements of 
inequality.  
 
2.3!The+effect+of+inequality+over+time+
After the literature review I find another shortcoming in the research on the relationship 
between inequality and democracy, the idea that inequality has the same effect on democracy 
at all points in time. The idea that inequality can have changing effects on democracy depending 
on how far back you measure inequality has not been tested in the literature, this is possibly 
due to the assumption that inequality does not change over time. 
The assumption that the inequality level in a country does not change has for 
example lead to the use of the inequality level for around two years back in time as an 
independent variable (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Bollen and Jackman (1985) motivate their 
independent variable by arguing that inequality in countries have not changed much over the 
last 20 years. The same line of argument is presented in the paper by Burkhart (1997). 
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  I argue that there is need to test if this fundamental assumption made in the 
research field is accurate and if not inequality affect democracy differently at different points 
in time. Perhaps could inequality take some time to effect democracy.  
Teorell (2010, p. 155) makes the observation that the effect of inequality on 
democracy either is investigated on a short or very long time frame and not enough research is 
conducted on an intermediate timeframe. I agree with Teorell and therefore argue that it is 
interesting to investigate the effect of inequality at different points in time.  
 
2.4!Conclusions+from+the+literature+review++
I draw several conclusions from the previous literature. Firstly, there is little consensus within 
the field, both when it comes to whether there is a relationship between inequality and 
democracy and if so how such a relationship looks like. A table with an overview of the papers 
included in the literature review and their main findings can be found in Appendix A.  
Another observation is the critique towards the data on inequality, which is often 
argued to have severe flaws in the country-years covered. Most studies have investigated the 
time period after World War two until today and most examined countries have been western 
countries even though there have been attempts to expand the data.  
 Finally, most of these studies assume inequality to be slow changing and have the 
same effect on democracy over time.  
 
3! Purposes+and+problem+formulation+
Previous literature has come to different conclusions on the relationship between inequality and 
democracy and the results could depend on the data available. Data on inequality is difficult to 
obtain since inequality is a tricky variable to measure. Furthermore, previous studies have 
measured inequality in a limited way and not included tests on how inequality might affect 
democracy at different points in time.  
All these issues noted above pose a problem to the research field. Severe 
disagreement in the research field on the relationship between inequality and democracy leads 
to a confused and unclear picture of if there is a relationship between inequality and democracy. 
The poor data-quality on inequality that some results are based on leads me to question if the 
results are different since the data on inequality varies. The lack of testing how inequality effect 
democracy levels at changing points in time has led to the assumption that inequality has the 
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same effect over time. This might have limited our understanding on how and when inequality 
affect democracy. 
In this master’s thesis my purpose is threefold and based on the identified issues 
within the field. First, I will investigate the relationship between inequality and democracy by 
testing the main contradicting theories all in one thesis. I choose to test the most widely known 
theories by Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Ansell and Samuels (2010) all in 
one paper. I thereby hope to bring some clarity on the relationship between inequality and 
democracy.  
Second, I will test an alternative measurement of inequality. If I find a good 
alternative measurement might some of the data quality issues on inequality be solved which 
could be of use for many fields of research. 
Finally, I will in this master’s thesis provide an analysis over time, where the 
effect of inequality on democracy at different points in time is investigated. This because 
previous research has made a fundamental assumption on the slow changing nature of 
inequality and has therefore not investigated the possibility of a changing effect over time.  
 
4! Theory+and+hypothesizes+
This section deals with the theoretical ideas on the relationship between inequality and 
democracy. First, I present the dominating theories within the literature. Then, I propose my 
theoretical argument for an alternative measurement of inequality and the link between this 
operationalization of inequality and democracy. Throughout this section I present the 
hypotheses that I formulate based on the theories. 
 
4.1!Main+previous+theoretical+arguments+on+why+inequality+effect+democracy++
The main theoretical argument in the previous literature is the redistribution argument presented 
by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinsson (2006), referred to in the literature review. This 
argument takes its departure from the median voter theorem by Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
which seeks to explain the relationship between the median voter, economic inequality and the 
want for redistribution. The argument is that there, as economic inequality increases, is an 
increased conflict between the elite and the poor (Boix, 2003).  
As economic inequality increases, the median voter will become relatively poorer 
and desire increased redistribution. Since it, according to the median voter theorem, is the 
median voter that holds the decisive power in a democracy will this lead to an increased want 
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for redistribution in a society that is a democracy. This relationship is according to Boix (2003) 
the reason why higher economic inequality is related to less probability of democratization. The 
elite instead chooses to suppress the poor and the society stays autocratic. This since the elite 
do not want redistribution and can avoid increased redistribution by hindering a democratic 
transition.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) propose a similar takeoff point but suggests that 
the likelihood of democratization will be small in societies with very low economic inequality 
since there then is little demand for redistribution and thereby for democracy. This would lead 
to a U-shape relationship between economic inequality and democracy, where societies with 
high and low inequality should have low or no democracy whilst intermediate levels of 
inequality should be associated with higher levels of democracy.  I, based on this theories, 
formulate the following testable hypothesizes: 
 
H1a: High economic inequality has a negative effect on democracy level.  
H1b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic inequality and 
democracy level.  
 
When it comes to the effect of economic inequality over time the established theories are not 
very elaborate. Boix (2003, p. 22) argues that the economic inequality-democracy relationship 
is a one shot game. It is the income inequality in each generation that will affect the probability 
of democratic transition. It could therefore be argued that the effect of inequality measured as 
economic inequality should be slow-moving and have an equal effect over the duration of each 
new generation. The following hypothesis I therefore formulate as: 
 
H1c: High economic inequality has a long time negative effect on democracy level.  
 
Ansell and Samuels (2010) presents an alternative theoretical framework, a contractarian 
theory. In their theory is there a conflict between the elite and the group with rising economic 
wellbeing and it is this conflict that drives democratization. The group with rising economic 
wellbeing will be afraid expropriation by the elite and will therefore be in favor of democracy.  
Furthermore, Ansell and Samuels (2010) differentiate between types of 
inequality, land inequality and economic inequality. They argue that different types of 
inequality should have different effects on the probability of democratization. A more equal 
society in terms of land inequality leads, as predicted by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and 
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Robinson (2006), to democratization. However, is the mechanism behind this in Ansell and 
Samuels (2010) that landholders want representation in order to avoid taxation and 
expropriation of their land from the political elites. When there are a lot of landholders, meaning 
a more equal society, there will therefore be a push for democratization.  
A high level of economic inequality is however associated with a higher 
likelihood to democratize. This is due to the fear of expropriation from the elites that the group 
with rising economic wellbeing has. A high income inequality is associated with higher 
likelihood of democratization since the newly rich will want democracy to avoid expropriation 
by the political elite, something that is more likely in a more democratic society.  
According to Ansell and Samuels (2010, p. 1561) their paper investigating the 
long run effect of inequality both measured as economic inequality and as the land inequality 
on democracy. However, they do not specify how long this long run effect is. The paper by 
Ansell and Samuels (2010) leads me to formulate the following hypothesizes: 
"
H2a: High land inequality has a negative effect on democracy level. 
H2b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between land inequality and democracy 
level.  
H2c: High economic inequality has a positive effect on the democracy level.  
H2d: High land inequality has a long time negative effect on democracy level.  
 
4.2!An+alternative+theoretical+framework++
One of my contributions in this master’s thesis is the introduction of an alternative 
measurements of inequality; the egalitarian democracy index developed by the V-Dem institute 
in the paper by Sigman and Lindberg (2015). I argue that there is a need for an alternative 
operationalization of inequality since the data on both economic and land inequality is poor and 
not representative (Houle, 2009).  The egalitarian democracy index is therefore in this master’s 
thesis tested as an alternative measurement of inequality. Data on this variable is available for 
most country-years and the method for calculating the index is transparent (Coppedge et al., 
2016a) 
The egalitarian democracy index is composed out of two sub-indices; the equal 
protection index and the equal distribution index. I propose to also use the equal distribution of 
resources index and its indicators as an alternative measurement of inequality. I argue that the 
egalitarian democracy index and the equal distribution of resources index should be able to 
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function as a measurement of inequality since they measure peoples equal access to resources 
(Sigman and Lindberg, 2015).  
The egalitarian democracy index and the equal distribution of resources index 
are in my thesis tested as measurements of inequality. I am testing whether they have the same 
mechanisms as the theories described by Boix (2003) and Ansell and Samuels (2010). However, 
I am not testing the theory of an inverted U-shape relationship between this alternative 
operationalization of inequality and democracy level, this since it is not within the scope of my 
thesis to as well investigate this theory. If I find these alternative measurements to work as 
measurements of inequality could a future step be to test the theory by Acemoglu and Robinson 
with this operationalization’s as well.  
I am aware that these indexes do not measure income inequality or land inequality 
as theorized by Boix (2003) and Ansell and Samuels (2010). The egalitarian democracy index 
and the equal distribution of resources index however measures peoples access to resources. If 
resources in society are more unevenly distributed should this lead to an increased want for 
redistribution from the median citizen. The country will be more autocratic if the resources are 
more unevenly distributed since the cost for repression by the elites will be smaller than the 
cost for redistribution that democracy means. In a country with a more equal distribution of 
resources will the cost for repression however be higher than the cost for redistribution and the 
country will be more democratic.  I also assume that the measurement of inequality functions 
over time in the same way as has been theorized by Boix (2003). 
I therefore formulate the following testable hypothesizes: 
 
H3a: Low inequality measured as a high value on the egalitarian democracy index has a 
positive effect on the democracy level. 
H3b: Low inequality measured as a high value on the equal distribution of resources 
index has a positive effect on the democracy level. 
H3c: Low inequality measured as high values on the egalitarian democracy index and 
the equal distribution of resources index has a long time positive effect on democracy 
level.  
 
The egalitarian democracy index is developed to measure a particular aspect of democracy and 
might therefore be highly correlated with democracy. I therefore propose to also investigate the 
relationship between the indicators that make up these indexes and the democracy level. The 
equal distribution of resources index is made up of seven indicators; spending on particularistic 
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or public goods; universal or means teste welfare programs; education inequality; health 
inequality; power by socioeconomic group; power by social group and power by gender 
(Sigman and Lindberg, 2015). I will in the remaining part of this section further present the 
theoretical arguments behind how and why the indicators in the equal distribution of resources 
index would affect democracy level within a country.  
 
4.2.1! Particularistic*or*public*goods*spending*in*budget*and*means*tested*or*universal*
welfare*systems**
The first two indicators that make up the equal distribution of resources index is the spending 
on particularistic or public goods indicator and the universal or means teste welfare programs 
indicator. These both indicators measures spending in the budget which benefits all 
communities and if the welfare system benefits everyone. A higher value means more equality.  
The theoretical link between these two indicators of the equal distribution of 
resources index and democracy level can be connected to the theories by Boix (2003) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Boix (2003) argues that economic inequality leads to 
democracy because the median citizens wish for redistribution increases with increased 
inequality and the elite rather suppress the public than redistribute and democratize.  
If there however already is a large public goods spending and universal welfare 
the argument could go that there is no desire for democracy since the citizens already have 
access to the benefits from redistribution.  
I formulate the following hypothesis based on this theory: 
 
H4a: A higher public goods spending and more universal welfare systems, meaning a 
more equal society, is associated with lower levels of democracy.  
 
The long-term effect of a change in the public good spending and universal welfare could 
arguable be that a decrease in the public goods spending immediately changes the redistribution 
preferences of the citizens. I should therefore see an effect of only a few years when a lower 
spending on public goods and less universal welfare systems are associated with an increased 
demand for democracy.  
The hypothesizes based on this theory I formulated as:  
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H4b: There is a negative effect of high public goods spending and more universal 
welfare systems of a few years on democracy level.  
 
4.2.2! Educational*inequality**
The third indicator of the equal distribution of resources index is educational inequality. 
Education and especially education level has been a part of the modernization theory of 
democracy presented by for example Lipset (1959) and Glaeser et al. (2007). According to the 
modernization theory the level of education is connected to democratization, where higher 
levels of education is associated with democracy (Glaeser et al., 2007). However, the 
modernization theory does not generally discuss how inequality of education within a country 
effects democracy.  
Castello-Climent (2008) investigates the effect that equal distribution of 
education has on democracy level in the post Second World War period. Castello-Climent argue 
that a more equal education is associated with a higher democracy level. The elite in a society 
with more equal educational level loses political control since education always shapes people’s 
political views to be in line with democracy. Equal education therefor leads to more widespread 
political opinions which favors democracy which then leads to a democratic transition.  
Barro (1999) too is interested in the effect of educational inequality on 
democracy. He uses education inequality between men and women as one of many independent 
variables which could affect democracy. Barro (1999) argue that educational inequality 
between men and women is a proxy for general educational inequality within a country. His 
results indicate that more unequal education between men and women has a significant negative 
effect on democracy. However, Barro (1999) does no investigation of the effect over time. 
Castello-Climent (2008) use a five-year lag of educational inequality and finds a significant 
result in line with the theory.  
Based on these previous studies are the following hypothesizes is formulated:  
 
H5a: A higher educational inequality is associated with a lower democracy level.  
H5b: The educational inequality both has a negative immediate effect and a negative 
effect of at least 5 years.  
 
4.2.3! Health*inequality**
The fourth indicator in the equal distribution of resources index is health inequality. The 
relationship between health inequality and democracy has been investigated by for example 
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Ruger (2005) but then in the other causal direction, if democracy effects health inequality. 
Ruger (2005) theorizes that in a democracy will the ruling party want the people to be happy 
and content to get re-elected, a democracy will therefore have less health inequality.  
Barro (1999) on the other hand studies the effect of health levels on democracy, 
health is in this study measured as the log life expectancy at birth. The results from Barro (1999) 
suggests that longer life expectancy is associated with a larger probability of democratization.  
A possible link between health inequality and democracy level could be that a 
higher inequality in society could hinder people from participating in democratic activities and 
it could therefore be easier for the elite to stay in power. An alternative theoretical argument 
could be that unequal healthcare for all in an undemocratic society would act as a base for 
unhappiness and therefore spark a want for change and thereby a transition to democracy.  
Based on the findings by Barro (1999) is this second line of argument disregarded 
and the following hypothesis formulated: 
 
H6a: An more unequal health care is associated with a lower level of democracy.  
 
There is a lack of literature and theories on the effect of health inequality on democracy over 
time. However, it could be argued that the effects of health are long term. It might take a long 
time to change a healthcare system and for this change to have an effect on the democracy level. 
Based on this line of argument is the following hypothesis is formulated:  
 
H6b: High health equality has a long time positive effect on the democracy level.   
 
4.2.4! Power*distributed*by*socioeconomic*group*and*social*group**
The fifth and sixth indicator in the equal distribution of resources index deals with power 
distributed by socioeconomic group and power distributed by social group. Theories on how 
power inequalities between groups effects democratization is found in for example Dahl (1971) 
in Haerpfer (2009, p.78). Here, the argument is that power inequality between groups leads to 
political inequality. Political inequality prevents democratization since all power is 
concentrated in an elite circle who do not want to democratize. 
Vahnanen (2003 p. 24) too argues that power resources between groups translates 
to political power resources. A more equal distribution of political power resources is therefore 
according to Vahnanen (ibid) associated with a higher level of democracy. The equal 
distribution of power resources is a direct cause of democracy since power resources 
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concentrated in one group equals the survival of autocratic political structures (Vahnanen 2003 
p. 154).  Vahnanen (2003 p. 67) assume inequality and democracy to be a stable relationship 
over time and I therefore argue that the effect of a change in the power structures between 
groups should be a long term effect.  
I have, based on these previous theories and studies, formulated the following 
hypothesizes.  
 
H7a: A more unequal distribution of power by socioeconomic group and social group 
is associated with a lower level of democracy.  
H7b: High power equality by socioeconomic group and social group has a long time 
positive effect on the democracy level.  
 
4.2.5! Power*distributed*by*gender**
The final, seventh indicator in the equal distribution of resources index is the power distributed 
by gender indicator. Inglehart, Norris and Welzel (2002) argues that support for gender 
inequality is not a consequence of democratization but both are the effect of a cultural change. 
They argue that people both want gender equality and democracy due to a change in cultural 
values. Ingleheart et al. (2002) additionally argue that such a change in culture take a long time 
to achieve but that the effect on both these should be simultaneously.  
I therefore propose the following hypothesizes: 
 
H8a: A lower gender inequality is associated with higher levels of democracy.  
H8b: There is an immediate effect of gender inequality on the level of democracy. 
 
5! Research+design+
I use a quantitative approach to investigate my proposed research question. I use a quantitative 
approach since this is the most widely used approach in this field of literature (see for example 
Boix (2003), Houle (2009), Teorell (2010) and Ansell and Samuels (2010)). I furthermore want 
to test the theories developed and investigated in mainly papers with a quantitative research 
design. By using a quantitative approach, I will be able to easily compare my results to the 
results found in previous studies and the results that these theories predict.  
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In this section I present my operationalization of the dependent, independent and 
control variables. This section furthermore presents the data from where I get the variables, the 
descriptive statistics of said variables and finally motivates the chosen estimation strategy.  
 
5.1!Operationalization+and+data+
This section presents the chosen operationalization of the dependent, independent and the 
control variables. I also give the descriptive statistics of all variables, the data sources and 
discuss some problems associated with the data.  
 
5.1.1! Dependent*variable*
The dependent variable in my thesis is democracy. There are many ways to operationalize and 
measure democracy, for example the dichotomous variable developed by Boix (2003).  I will 
use the polity score of a country to measure the level of democracy.  I use this operationalization 
of democracy since this is an operationalization that has been used by other studies (see for 
example Ansell and Samuels (2010)).   
The polity score furthermore has the benefit of being a numerical variable and I 
can therefore use it to measure how inequality effect the level of democracy and not just the 
likelihood whether a country is democratic or not.  
The data on the polity score variable is found in the V-Dem data set from 2016 
which in turn get the data from the Polity IV dataset (Coppedge et al., 2016a). The specific 
variable used is the Polity combined score, a score that is calculated by subtracting the country’s 
score on autocracy from its score on democracy. The variable varies between +10, which is 
strong democracy in a country, and -10, which is strong autocracy in a country.  
The democracy score for a country in the Polity data is measured by using three 
parts, the first part is the existence of institutions thru which citizens can “express effective 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders” (Coppedge et al., 2016a p. 355). The second 
part of democracy in a country is according to Polity IV is the ”existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive” (ibid). The final part of democracy is the 
presence of guaranteed civil liberties to all citizens. The variables measured for the democracy 
score of a country are; the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of the recruitment of the executive and the constraints on the chief executive.  
The autocracy measurement measured by assessing the restriction or suppression 
of competitive political participation.  This means that a country is said to be more autocratic if 
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the executives are chosen within a political elite and have few political constraints when they 
are in power (Coppedge et al., 2016a p. 355).  
The combined polity score for a country is then calculated by subtracting the score 
for autocracy from the score on democracy.  
 
 
Table+1.+Summary+statistics+dependent+variable+
*
Variable*
*
Mean*
*
Standard*
deviation*
*
Min*
*
Max*
*
Observations*
*
Polity*score*
+ + + + +
Overall* 0.6089+ 7.2814+ R10+ 10+ N+=+11226+
Between* + 5.5587+ R10+ 10+ n+=+163+
Within** + 4.7253+ R16.9083+ 14.7210+ T+=+68.8712+
+
Data+retrieved+from+the+VRDem+dataset+(Coppedge+et+al.,+2016b)+
+
 
5.1.2! Independent*variables*
Just like for the democracy variable are there numerous ways to measure and operationalize 
inequality.  According to Haughton and Khandker (2009 p. 103) is income inequality a broad 
concept defined over the whole population in a country.  The criterion for a good measurement 
of income inequality is according to Haughton and Khandker (2009 p. 105 – 106) 1) mean 
independence, meaning that a doubled income would not change the measurement; 2) 
population size independence, meaning that the inequality measure will not change with a 
change in population size; 3) symmetry, meaning that the inequality measure should not be 
effected if two people switch income; 4) Pigou-Dalton Transfer sensitivity, meaning that the 
income inequality measurement is reduced if income is transferred from a rich person to a poor 
person; 5) decomposability, meaning that the inequality measurement can be broken down into 
for example population groups or income sources and finally; 6) statistical testability, meaning 
that it should be possible to test for significant changes over time.  
The operationalization of inequality is one of the main disagreements within the 
field and previous studies on inequality has been operationalized by using very different data. 
Some of the more common operationalization’s of inequality are the usage of the Gini 
coefficient, the share of income held by different quintiles of the population and the distribution 
of land. I choose to operationalize inequality by using two of these most common previously 
used measurements, the Gini coefficient and Land inequality.  
I furthermore include an alternative measurement of inequality: the V-Dem 
egalitarian principle of democracy and its sub-indexes, components and indicators. Further 
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motivation for using these independent variables and this alternative measurement of inequality 
can be found in the theoretical chapter and further down in this section.  
 
5.1.2.1!The*Gini*coefficient**
The Gini coefficient is one of the most used operationalization of economic inequality. 
However, studies using the Gini coefficient as a measurement of inequality has come to 
different conclusions on the relationship between economic inequality and democratization, see 
for example Boix (2003) and Teorell (2010).  
The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve which is a cumulative frequency 
curve that can compare the distribution of for example income with a complete equal 
distribution (Haughton and Khandker, 2009 p. 104).  
The Gini coefficient varies between 0 and 1 and as the Gini coefficient increases 
is this a sign of a more unequal distribution of income. The Gini coefficient fulfills the criterions 
for a good measurement of income inequality according to Haughton and Khandker (2009 p. 
105 – 106). I therefore propose to use the Gini coefficient as a measurement of inequality.  
 I furthermore motivate my choice of using the Gini coefficient as a measurement 
of inequality by referring to previous studies.  The Gini coefficient has been used in many 
previous studies but the data source that it has been based on has been varying, Boix (2003) has 
for example used the Deininger and Squire data whilst Teorell (2010) have used data by 
Galbrait and Kum and Haggard and Kaufman (2012) has used data from the Estimated 
Household Income Inequality (EHII) dataset from 2008. 
I use the Gini coefficient included in the 2015 V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 
2016b). This Gini coefficient is based on data collected by UNU-WIDER in 2008. The V-Dem 
data accounts for historical missing observations by interpolation, this they argue is appropriate 
given the stickiness of the measurement. Missing data from the last observation up until todays 
data is filled by repeating the last observation (Coppedge et al., 2016a). 
 
5.1.2.2!Land*inequality*
The land inequality measurement is an alternative measurement of income inequality, where 
land ownership instead of income is used. Previous studies by Ansell and Samuels (2010) have 
used land inequality as an alternative measurement. Ansell and Samuels (2010) used data by 
Vahnanen (2003) where share of family farms is estimated. A larger percent of family farm 
indicates a more equal distribution of land and thus a more equal society.  
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 I argue that the land inequality measurements of family farms hold up to the 
criterion for a good measurement of income inequality since it is independent of mean, 
population size, decomposable and has signs of symmetry. 
The data on this variable is taken from the V-Dem dataset and the work by 
Vanhanen (2003). This variable measures the percentage of cultivated land that are family 
farmed (Coppedge, 2016a, p.381).   
The Vahnanen data is included in the V-Dem dataset, however are there a lot of 
missing data, the variable has therefore been interpolated so that ever 10th year is included. This 
has been done to increase the number of observations (Coppedge, 2016a, p.381).  
 
5.1.2.3!Egalitarian*principle*of*democracy*and*its*subcomponent*
I propose to use an alternative operationalization and measurement of inequality, the egalitarian 
principle of democracy index developed by the V-Dem institute. The V-Dem institute proposes 
the use of several different aspects of democracy in order to capture this multifaceted concept, 
one of them being the egalitarian principle of democracy (Coppedge et al, 2016c). 
The V-Dem principle of egalitarian democracy imagines that material and 
immaterial inequality prevent individuals to exercise their rights and liberties and thereby 
hinders them to participate. The egalitarian principle of democracy is achieved when all 
individuals have equally protected rights and when resources are distributed equally (Sigman 
and Lindberg, 2015).  
The egalitarian component index is composed out of the equal protection index 
and the equal distribution of resources index (Sigman and Lindberg, 2015).  It is this equal 
distribution of resources index that I argue could be an alternative measurement of inequality. 
The egalitarian component index, the equal distribution of resources index and the indicators 
does not hold to the Haughton and Khandker (2009) criterions for a good measurement of 
income inequality since they are not measuring income inequality but rather the equal 
distribution of other resources.  
The data on the egalitarian democracy index and its components is collected from 
the V-Dem dataset. The variables are coded by using V-Dem country experts in combination 
with factual data. Advantages with using the V-Dem indexes include that the V-Dem data and 
principles are freely available and is a widely transparent on how and what indicators that make 
up the different principles (Coppedge et al, 2016c). Another advantage is that the indices can 
be broken down further, to indicator level and it is therefore possible to see which indicator that 
is driving the relationship. Another aspect that makes the V-Dem data useful is it long time 
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span, reaching back to 1900 (Coppedge et al, 2016c).  This could deal with the problems that 
other operationalization’s of inequality face, where only a short time frame is available and the 
country-years that can be investigated are somewhat ad hoc.  
One concern with using the index on egalitarian democracy index as a 
measurement of inequality is the possibility of a close correlation with the dependent variable 
which too is a democracy measure. To address both this issue and to make additional theoretical 
contributions to the field is the subcomponent index of the equal distribution of resources and 
its component indicators used as independent variables.  
The equal distribution of resources index is intended to measure the distribution 
of several important resources. The index is therefore created out of several indicators. These 
are spending on particularistic or public goods; universal or means teste welfare programs; 
education inequality; health inequality; power by socioeconomic group; power by social group 
and power by gender (Sigman and Lindberg, 2015). 
The first indicator is spending on particularistic or public goods indicator the 
coders are asked to consider “social and infrastructural spending in the national budget” 
(Coppedge et al, 2016a, p. 195-196). More specifically it asks them to rate if spending is 
particularistic, meaning targeted to specific groups, regions or sectors. Public goods spending 
is on the other hand spending which benefits all communities. A higher value indicates more 
public goods spending and thereby more equality (ibid).  
The second indicator is the means tested versus universal welfare programs 
indicator.  This indicator asks the coders to estimate if the welfare systems are means tested, 
targeted to the poor population, or if they are universal, i.e. benefits everyone. A higher value 
on this indicator means that closer to all welfare programs are universal and thereby more 
equally distributed (Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.196-197).   
The third indicator measures educational inequality. This asks the coders to 
estimate to what extent “high quality basic education” is guaranteed to all.  A higher value 
indicates that close to all have guaranteed basic education and therefore indicate more equality 
(Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.252).  
The forth indicator in the equal distribution index is healthcare inequality. This 
indicator measures to what extent “high quality basic healthcare” is guaranteed to all. The 
healthcare should be sufficient for people to be able to exercise their rights and participate in 
the political system. A higher value indicate that basic health care is more equal in quality and 
that more people can exercise their rights (Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.253).   
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The fifth indicator is power by socioeconomic group. This indicator asks the 
coders to estimate how political power is distributed amongst different socioeconomic groups.  
A higher value indicates that “wealthier people have no more political power than those whose 
economic status is average or poor”. This means that political power is more equally distributed 
across economic groups (Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.249-250). 
The sixth indicator is power by social group. This indicator asks the coders to 
estimate how political power is distributed amongst different social groups, for example 
ethnicity, language, race, region or religion.  A higher value indicates that “all social groups 
have roughly equal political power” (Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.250). 
The final indicator is power by gender. This indicator asks the coders to estimate 
if political power is distributed according to gender. A higher value indicate that men and 
women have roughly equal political power (Coppedge et al, 2016a, p.251). 
 
Table+2.+Summary+statistics+independent+variables++
*
Variable*
*
Mean*
Standard*
deviation*
*
Min*
*
Max*
*
Observations*
Gini** + + + + +
Overall* 41.0706+ 10.5242+ 15+ 73.9+ N+=+6340+
Between** + 9.1620+ 21.9290+ 73.9+ n+=+145+
Within** + 5.4597+ 20.9965+ 71.8533+ T+=+43.7241+
Gini^2* + + + + +
Overall* 1797.542+ 907.8434+ 225+ 5461.21+ N+=+6340+
Between** + 797.6313+ 489.5063+ 5461.21+ n+=+145+
Within** + 473.123+ R114.9938+ 5300.893+ T+=+43.7241+
Family*farms* + + + + +
Overall* 41.4684+ 23.8597+ 0+ 98+ N+=+666+
Between** + 21.12817+ 0+ 90.5+ n+=+159+
Within** + 12.01625+ 4.968468+ 88.63514+ T+=+4.1886+
Family*farms^2* + + + + +
Overall* 2288.066+ 2248.685+ 0+ 9604+ N+=+666+
Between** + 1936.363+ 1+ 8204.167+ n+=+159+
Within** + 1037.96+ R2222.767+ 6662.233+ T+=+4.1886+
Egalitarian*democracy* + + + + +
Overall* 0.4423+ 0.2784+ 0.0285+ 0.9864+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 0.2267+ 0.0964+ 0.9404+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.1673+ R0.0511+ 0.9622+ T+=+97.2189+
Equal*distribution*of*
resources*
+ + + + +
Overall* 0.4133+ 0.3090+ 0.0061+ 0.9910+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 0.2466+ 0.0459+ 0.9481+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.1967+ R0.2392+ 1.0461+ T+=+97.2189+
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Particularistic*or*public*
goods*
+ + + + +
Overall* 0.0216+ 1.4858+ R3.5092+ 3.1538+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.1472+ R2.1672+ 2.5929+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9103+ R3.3092+ 3.7798+ T+=+97.2189+
Universal*welfare* + + + + +
Overall* R0.1698+ 1.4749+ R3.2627+ 3.2323+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.0813+ R2.1214+ 2.9457+ n+=+169+
Within** + 1.0333+ R3.5457+ 2.9948+ T+=+97.2189+
Education*inequality* + + + + +
Overall* R0.3409+ 1.6361+ R3.1429+ 3.6508+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.3812+ R2.5146+ 3.3076+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9665+ R3.9931+ 2.8373+ T+=+97.2189+
Health*inequality** + + + + +
Overall* R0.2241+ 1.5983+ R3.2156+ 3.8246+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.3443+ R2.9624+ 2.8149+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9343+ R3.0846+ 3.3128+ T+=+97.2189+
Power*by*socioeconomic*
group*
+ + + + +
Overall* R0.4016+ 1.4510+ R3.5585+ 3.2521+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.0688+ R2.2842+ 2.0329+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9916+ R4.3019+ 2.7589+ T+=+97.2189+
Power*by*social*group* + + + + +
Overall* R0.1989+ 1.5194+ R3.0069+ 3.3112+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 1.2094+ R2.4572+ 2.8614+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9324+ R2.8566+ 4.1127+ T+=+97.2189+
Power*by*gender* + + + + +
Overall* R0.7840+ 1.3216+ R2.9817+ 4.1967+ N+=+16430+
Between** + 0.9172+ R2.8598+ 1.7560+ n+=+169+
Within** + 0.9753+ R4.2337+ 3.8650+ T+=+97.2189+
Data+retrieved+from+the+VRDem+dataset+(Coppedge+et+al.,+2016b)+
 
5.1.3! Control*variables**
I will, in my analysis, use a number of control variables. These are variables that could account 
for both the level of democracy and the level of inequality in a country, and therefore needs to 
be controlled for. I base my selection of control variables on the paper by Houle (2009), Boix 
(2003) and Ansell and Samuels (2010).  
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Economic variables have been shown to have an effect on democracy in previous 
studies. Lipset (1959) for example argues that countries that are more economically developed 
are more likely to install democracy. I therefore control for economic development since it 
might affect democratization. Economic development could as well affect the level of 
inequality thru the Kuznet curve (Houle 2009). I use data by Gleditsch (2002), found in the 
QoG dataset (Dahlberg, 2017). The variables used is log of GDP per capita. The data from these 
variables stretches from around 1945 until around 2000. The GDP per capita variable is the real 
GDP per capita estimate in constant US dollars with the base year of 2000.   
Houle (2009, p. 603) argues that it is necessary to control for the resource curse 
theory, which states that a country with high revenues from natural resources prevent 
democratization since it provides revenues to the state. The elites in a country that has high 
revenues from natural resources are more reluctant to democratization since they want to avoid 
taxation. It is furthermore reasonable to think that large natural resources affect the inequality 
level since the revenues from these are more likely to go to an elite part of society and therefore 
have a negative effect on the level of inequality. I use variables from Haber and Menaldo 
(2011), extracted from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2016b) to control for the resource 
curse. This variable measures the real value of a country’s petroleum production (Coppedge et 
al, 2016a). 
The regional context of democratization is thought to effect the likelihood of 
democratization and inequality, Houle (2009) therefore controls for the proportion of 
democracies in the world. I will not control for the proportions of democracies in the world but 
use a variable that measure the percent of democracies in the region instead.  I use the variable 
by Haber & Menaldo (2011) retrieved from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al, 2016b). This 
variable measures the percentages of democracies within the region (Coppedge et al, 2016a). 
Both Ansell and Samuels (2010) and Boix (2003) controls for educational 
attainment. I use the same variables as Ansell and Samuels (2010) to capture this, namely the 
percent of students per 100000 that are at university collected by Vahnanen (2003) and retrieved 
from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al, 2016b).  
A final control variable is population size. Barro (1999) control for the log of the 
population since larger countries could be harder to control and therefore could be assumed to 
be less democratic. I use the logged population in 1000s by Gleditsch (2002) retrieved from the 
QoG dataset to control for population size (Dahlberg, 2017).  
Another set of variables that can influence both the dependent and the 
independent variable is the cultural and social context. Religion has been thought to effect on 
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democratization, where Protestantism is thought to be most helpful to democracy. Inequality is 
too thought to be affected by religion since different religions could have different tolerance 
levels of inequality. Houle (2009) adds variables for religious and ethnic fractionalization since 
this can effect democratization since in a more fractionalized society is the incumbent less likely 
to want to leave power to a member from another group. I will however, in my master’s thesis, 
not control for these variables since I assume that they do not vary over time.  
 
Table+3.+Summary+statistics+control+variables+
 
Variable* Mean* Standard*
deviation*
Min* Max* Observations*
Log*GDP*per*capita* + + + + +
Overall* 8.3571+ 1.2339+ 4.8889+ 13.3570+ N+=+9316+
Between** + 1.1390+ 6.0406+ 11.2737+ n+=+199+
Within** + 0.4416+ 6.1571+ 10.8754+ T+=+46.8141+
*
Log*GDP*per*
capita^2*
+ + + + +
Overall* 71.3652+ 21.0846+ 23.9022+ 178.4101+ N+=+9316+
Between** + 19.3898+ 36.5509+ 127.5083+ n+=+199+
Within** + 7.6203+ 35.1894+ 131.5333+ T+=+46.8141+
Educational*
inequality*
+ + + + +
Overall* 47.2586+ 27.8077+ 1.3388+ 99.8043+ N+=+10980+
Between** + 24.4161+ 7.6192+ 95.1623+ n+=+135+
Within** + 14.8558+ R2.3110+ 97.8310+ T+=+81.3333+
Log*population* + + + + +
Overall* 8.4390+ 2.1210+ 1.7917+ 14.0964+ N+=+9316+
Between** + 2.1411+ 2.2346+ 13.7326+ n+=+199+
Within** + 0.3390+ 6.6951+ 9.8741+ T+=+46.8141+
Oil*income* + + + + +
Overall* 271.1003+ 2102.757+ 0+ 78588.8+ N+=+10256+
Between** + 1592.491+ 0+ 18421.24+ n+=+157+
Within** + 1444.415+ R18150.14+ 60438.66+ T+=+65.3248+
Democracy*in*
region**
+ + + + +
Overall* 30.9035+ 32.8309+ 0+ 100+ N+=+10154+
Between** + 26.3233+ 3.3707+ 93.9071+ n+=+155+
Within** + 16.3705+ R21.1797+ 97.7854+ T+=+65.5097+
  
Data+retrieved+from+the+VRDem+dataset+(Coppedge+et+al.,+2016b)+and+the+QoG+dataset+(Dahlberg,+2017).+
  
 
5.2!Estimation+strategy++
I use a time series cross section statistical model with fixed effects for investigating the research 
question and to confirm or reject the hypothesizes. I use this regression model since my data is 
in the form of time series data. I can tell that my data is in the form of time series data since my 
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units of observations are country-year, meaning that I have observation for each country for 
each year, for example Sweden 1998, Sweden 1999 etcetera (Wooldridge, 2014).  
I can, by using a time series cross sectional regression model with country fixed 
effects, investigate the effects within countries over time (Lührman, McMann and van Ham, 
2017). It will thereby be possible for me to investigate how inequality has effected democracy 
levels within the country over time. I use clustered standard errors on the country variable since 
I assume the error term to be correlated within countries but uncorrelated between countries.  
I will in my analysis run regressions with all of the above described measurements 
of inequality as independent variables. I can, based on the significant results, find which of the 
theoretical models that hold. I can thereby answer the first part of my purpose which asked 
which of the established theories that best can explain the relationship between inequality and 
democracy level. To test the theoretical argument made by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) of 
the inverted U-shape relationship between inequality and democracy I will use squared 
variables of the inequality measurements of the Gini coefficient and land inequality in 
regression models. If the squared variable is significant then this is a sign of the existence of an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and democracy level.  
The second part of my purpose was to test an alternative operationalization of 
inequality, the egalitarian principle of democracy and its subcomponent indexes and indicators. 
I therefore run the same regression model with these operationalization’s as the independent 
variables.  
To test the last purpose of the study, which is the effect of inequality over time I 
will use the same regression model as described above. However, instead of using the normal 
independent variables I will use the lags of my independent variable. I lag all the independent 
variables up to 60 years back in time. If the coefficient for this lagged variable is significant I 
can see that this lag of the independent variable affect democracy level. I can in this way test 
the third purpose of my thesis.  
 
5.3!Delimitations++
A general problem in the research field on the relationship between inequality and democracy 
is the causality of the relationship. Even though a significant result is found can it be hard to 
argue that the causal direction is one where inequality leads to democracy and not the other way 
around. It could, and have, been argued that an increasing level of democracy leads to lower 
inequality and not the other way around.  
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 Researches such as Ansell and Samuels (2010) have tried to solve the 
bidirectional causality problem by using an instrumental variable approach. They have used a 
regional Gini coefficient as an instrument and have found this to be a sufficient instrumental 
variable even though it is not completely randomly assigned.  
The purpose for my master’s thesis is not to establish a causal direction but merely 
to investigate if I find an affect of inequality on democracy and if this affect varies over time 
and changes when I use alternative and more available operationalization’s of inequality. For 
me to also develop and use an instrumental variable in order to try to establish any causal 
direction has not been possible within the scope of this thesis. I do however find the exploration 
of a causal direction between inequality and democracy to be an important and interesting topic 
for future research. I will be careful to say that any significant effects of inequality on 
democracy are causal effects due to the discussion and disagreement over the causal direction 
of the relationship between inequality and democracy. 
Another delimitation in my study is the time frame investigated. Ideally would I 
have investigated the whole of the 20th century since this is when a lot of countries 
democratized. Data limitations on variables such as land inequality however restricts the 
investigated time-period to 1951-2006.  
 
6! Analysis+and+results++
 
In this section, I present my analysis and findings. I present the results in the same order as the 
purposes of my study, starting by testing the different established operationalization’s of 
inequality, the Gini coefficient and land inequality, on democracy level. I find in my results no 
proof for any the theories between the previously used measurements of inequality and 
democracy level.  
I then present the results of the alternative operationalization of inequality, the V-
Dem egalitarian index and its subcomponent indexes and indicators. I here find mixed results, 
where some of the indexes and indicators are significant and effects democracy level in the 
direction predicted.   
Finally, I present the results of the effect of the independent variables on 
democracy level over time. Here I find that the effect of inequality varies greatly over time 
where some measurements have a significant effect on democracy for one or a couple of years 
and then remains insignificant.  
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6.1!Gini+and+Land+inequality+effect+on+democracy+level++
This section starts with the presentation of the results with the Gini coefficient as the 
independent variable. I then continue by presenting the results of land inequality on democracy 
level.  
 
 
Table+4.+Time+series+cross+section+regression+models+with+fixed+effects+and+clustered+standard+errors.+Dependent+
variable+is+Polity+score,+independent+variables+Gini+coefficient+and+the+Gini+coefficient+squared.+The+years+
analyzed+are+between+1951+and+2006.++
+ (1)+ (2)+
Variable+ Polity+ Polity+
+ + +
Gini+ R0.0174+ +
+ (0.0292)+ +
Gini^2+ + R0.0003+
+ + (0.0003)+
Log+GDP+per+capita+ R6.8976+ R6.9236+
+ (5.6080)+ (5.5991)+
Log+GDP+per+capita^2+ 0.4197+ 0.4225+
+ (0.3402)+ (0.3395)+
Educational+Gini+ R0.1017**+ R0.1021*+
+ (0.0513)+ (0.0516)+
Log+population+ 0.9495+ 0.9859+
+ (2.5384)+ (2.5312)+
Oil+income+ R0.0001+ R0.0001+
+ (0.0002)+ (0.0002)+
Democracy+in+region++ 0.1209***+ 0.1220***+
+ (0.0177)+ (0.0179)+
Year+ Yes+ Yes+
Constant+ 24.3295+ 23.9725+
+ (29.7963)+ (29.8025)+
+ + +
Observations+ 4,528+ 4,528+
RRsquared+ 0.3459+ 0.3468+
Number+of+countries+ 124+ 124+
Data+retrieved+from+the+VRDem+dataset+(Coppedge+et+al.,+2016b)+and+the+QoG+dataset+(Dahlberg,+2017).+
Robust+standard+errors+in+parentheses+
***+p<0.01,+**+p<0.05,+*+p<0.1+
 
 
The result from table 4 shows that the Gini coefficient has a negative effect on polity score, this 
is a result that is in line with theories by for example Boix (2003) who state that higher levels 
the Gini should be associated with lower levels of democracy. However, is the effect not 
statistically significant neither when the Gini nor when the squared Gini variable is used as 
independent variable. These results are in line with the theory presented by Ansell and Samuels 
(2010) but contradicts the theories presented and developed by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006).  Toerell (2010) is one in a line of authors who have found similar results.  
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Education Gini have a negative significant effect on Polity level, which is in line 
with theory, where a higher inequality in education should be associated with lower democracy 
levels. The other significant coefficient is democracy in the region, the coefficient of this 
variable is positive. This is also in line with previous findings, where a higher level of 
democracy in the region is associated with higher levels of democracy within the country.  
 The results of an insignificant Gini coefficient lead me to reject hypothesis H1a, 
which said that high economic inequality should have a negative effect on democracy level and 
H2c, which said that higher economic inequality should have a positive effect on 
democratization. I furthermore reject hypothesis H1b, which suggested a U-shape relationship 
between democracy and inequality, since the Gini square variable is insignificant. This leads 
me to conclude that the relationship between inequality measured as Gini and democracy level 
is not an inverted U-shaped relationship.  
The results indicate that inequality, operationalized as the Gini coefficient, has no 
effect on the level of democracy in a country. Inequality operationalized with the Gini 
coefficient does not have an effect on democracy measured as institutions where citizens can 
“express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders”, the ”existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive” or the presence of 
guaranteed civil liberties to all citizens(Coppedge, 2016a p. 355). 
Previous studies that has found any relationship between inequality and 
democracy are according to the results in table 4 wrong. What matters for democracy level is, 
according to table 4, the percent of democracies in the region and whether there is equal 
education. A more equal income distribution is not associated with a higher democracy level in 
a country. If the median voter becomes relatively poorer, as described by Boix (2003), this does 
not lead to a push for democracy in a country but it seems to have no effect. However, if the 
percent of democracies in the region goes up has this a large positive effect on the democracy 
level within a country. If the education inequality goes up has this a negative effect on 
democracy level, this result is in line with the results by Castello-Climent (2008).  
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Table+5.+Time+series+cross+section+regression+models+with+fixed+effects+and+clustered+standard+errors.+Dependent+
variable+is+Polity+score,+independent+variables+family+farms+and+family+farms+squared.+The+years+analyzed+are+
between+1951+and+2006,+with+10+year+intervals.++
+ (3)+ (4)+
Variable+ Polity+ Polity+
+ + +
Family+farms+ R0.0244+ +
+ (0.0218)+ +
Family+farms^2+ + R0.0003+
+ + (0.0003)+
Log+GDP+per+capita+ R0.0836+ R0.1581+
+ (6.3821)+ (6.3930)+
Log+GDP+per+capita^2+ 0.0163+ 0.0245+
+ (0.3890)+ (0.3891)+
Educational+Gini+ R0.1061*+ R0.1080*+
+ (0.0589)+ (0.0589)+
Log+population+ R0.5287+ R0.5741+
+ (2.2859)+ (2.2432)+
Oil+income+ 0.0000+ 0.0000+
+ (0.0002)+ (0.0002)+
Democracy+in+region++ 0.1140***+ 0.1114***+
+ (0.0233)+ (0.0234)+
Year+ Yes+ Yes+
Constant+ 7.2641+ 7.6363+
+ (32.3673)+ (32.2715)+
+ + +
Observations+ 510+ 510+
RRsquared+ 0.3218+ 0.3228+
Number+of+countries+ 132+ 132+
Data+retrieved+from+the+VRDem+dataset+(Coppedge+et+al.,+2016b)+and+the+QoG+dataset+(Dahlberg,+2017).+
Robust+standard+errors+in+parentheses+
***+p<0.01,+**+p<0.05,+*+p<0.1+
 
The results from table 5 show that there is a negative effect of both family farms and family 
farms squared on polity score. The results indicate that a higher percentage of family farms is 
associated with lower levels of democracy, a result that goes against the theory by Ansell and 
Samuels (2010). The coefficients of family farms and family farms squared are not significant. 
These results are against all the theories presented in the theory chapter. Like in the previous 
table are the only significant coefficients the ones on educational Gini and democracy in the 
region. 
 I, based on these results, reject hypothesis H2a of there being a negative 
relationship between land inequality and democracy level. Furthermore, I reject hypothesis H2b 
of there being an inverted U-shape relationship between land inequality and democracy level.  
As for the section on the Gini coefficient, have previous studies that has found a 
relationship according to these results been wrong and what matters for democracy level is the 
percent of democracies in the region and if there is equal education. My results indicate that 
inequality, operationalized as the percent of family farms, has no effect on the level of 
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democracy in a country. A larger share of family farms in a country does not lead to a higher 
democracy level. A higher level of family farms does not have an effect on democracy measured 
as institutions where citizens can “express effective preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders”, the ”existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive” or the presence of guaranteed civil liberties to all citizens (Coppedge et al., 2016a 
p. 355). The mechanism described by Ansell and Samuels (2010) where landholders wants 
representation in order to avoid taxation and expropriation of the land does not seem to be the 
case in my study.  
 It is furthermore important to point out the number of observation that these 
results are based on. In table 4 were the number of observations over 4500 whilst the regressions 
in table 5, with land inequality, only has 500 observations. This clearly illustrate the problems 
with obtaining data on the variable of inequality, and especially land inequality.  
 
6.2!The+alternative+operationalization+of+inequality++
I present in this section of my analysis the results of the alternative operationalization of 
inequality, where I have used the V-Dem indexes and indicators to measure inequality.  
The result in table 6 show that the egalitarian democracy index has a positive and 
significant effect on polity score. This effect is in line with the theory presented in the theory 
chapter and I can confirm hypothesis H3a of there being a positive effect of egalitarian 
democracy index on democracy level. I can furthermore confirm hypothesis H3b since a high 
value of the equal distribution of resources index, low inequality, is associated with a higher 
level of democracy. This significant effect might however be due to a close correlation between 
the polity score and the score on egalitarian democracy. A correlation matrix is included in 
appendix B. This matrix shows that the correlation between the egalitarian democracy index 
and the polity variable is 0,79, this can be compared to the correlation between the Gini 
coefficient and the polity variable which is -0,12. The other variables in the equal distribution 
of resources index does not show the same high correlation with polity.  
The coefficient of the equal distribution of resource index has a significant effect 
on the polity score in the predicted direction. This leads me to confirm hypothesis H3b, where 
a higher value on the equal distribution of resources value should be associated with a higher 
value on the democracy level.  
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Table&6.&Time&series&cross&section&regression&models&with&fixed&effects&and&clustered&standard&errors.&Dependent&variable&is&Polity&score,&independent&variables:&the&egalitarian&
democracy&principle&index,&the&equal&distribution&of&resources&index,&the&particularistic&or&public&goods&indicator,&the&universal&welfare&indicator,&the&educational&inequality&
indicator,&the&health&inequality&indicator,&the&power&by&socioeconomic&group&indicator,&the&power&by&social&group&indicator&and&the&power&by&gender&indicator.&The&years&
analyzed&are&between&1951&and&2006.&&
&
& (5)& (6)& (7)& (8)& (9)& (10)& (11)& (12)& (13)& (14)&
Variables& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity& Polity&
& & & & & & & & & & &
Egalitarian&democracy&
principle&
17.6908***&
(3.2572)&
& & & & & & & & &
& & & & & & & & & & &
Equal&distribution&of&
resources&
& 9.8577***&
(3.0974)&
& & & & & & & &
&
Particularistic&or&public&goods&
& & 1.0230**&
(0.4196)&
& & & & & & &
&
Universal&welfare&
& & & &
0.9260*&
(0.5300)&
& & & & & &
& & & & & & & & & & &
Educational&inequality& & & & & 0.6080&
(0.5657)&
0.4766&
(0.5488)&
& & & &
& & & & & & & & & & &
Health&inequality&& & & & & & & 0.8979&
(0.5471)&
& & &
& & & & & & & & & & &
Power&by&socioeconomic&
group&
& & & & & & & 1.6322***&
(0.4204)&
& &
& & & & & & & & & &
Power&by&social&group& & & & & & & & & 2.6123***&
(0.4221)&
&
& & & & & & & & & & &
Power&by&gender& & & & & & & & & & 1.8207***&
& & & & & & & & & & (0.5852)&
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Log&GDP&per&capita& S1.4392& S2.6964& S3.1313& S3.2716& S3.6885& S0.6388& S3.6522& S2.5707& S1.2707& S1.0050&
& (4.2475)& (4.6097)& (4.8407)& (4.9097)& (4.8947)& (3.6373)& (4.8877)& (4.9384)& (4.5396)& (4.9343)&
Log&GDP&per&capita^2& 0.0695& 0.1578& 0.1985& 0.1987& 0.2282& 0.0452& 0.2177& 0.1764& 0.0970& 0.0606&
& (0.2549)& (0.2765)& (0.2912)& (0.2947)& (0.2920)& (0.2163)& (0.2912)& (0.2960)& (0.2686)& (0.2930)&
Educational&Gini& S0.0917**& S0.0934**& S0.0845*& S0.0835*& S0.0891*& & S0.0953**& S0.0990**& S0.0905**& S0.1011**&
& (0.0385)& (0.0415)& (0.0433)& (0.0439)& (0.0455)& & (0.0452)& (0.0426)& (0.0410)& (0.0454)&
Log&population& S2.1640& S2.0329& S1.0771& S1.5273& S0.7570& 0.4966& S1.1328& S2.5510& S0.9259& S1.1617&
& (1.7697)& (1.9760)& (2.0077)& (2.0270)& (1.9801)& (1.3318)& (1.9937)& (2.0592)& (1.8612)& (2.0379)&
Oil&income& 0.0000& S0.0000& S0.0000& S0.0000& S0.0000& 0.0000& S0.0000& S0.0000& 0.0000& 0.0000&
& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0000)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)& (0.0001)&
Democracy&in&region& 0.0813***& 0.1027***& 0.1115***& 0.1116***& 0.1146***& 0.1109***& 0.1121***& 0.1050***& 0.0940***& 0.0996***&
& (0.0166)& (0.0177)& (0.0173)& (0.0173)& (0.0171)& (0.0160)& (0.0171)& (0.0180)& (0.0166)& (0.0192)&
Year& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes& Yes&
&
Constant& 20.1666& 27.1248& 23.1615& 28.1394& 23.4940& S5.3565& 27.4548& 34.1263& 14.3844& 18.7897&
& (22.4645)& (24.1990)& (24.9181)& (25.3693)& (25.7540)& (17.7420)& (26.0483)& (24.0022)& (23.9707)& (25.4581)&
& & & & & & & & & & &
Observations& 6,013& 6,013& 6,013& 6,013& 6,013& 6,687& 6,013& 6,013& 6,013& 6,013&
RSsquared& 0.4217& 0.3655& 0.3430& 0.3376& 0.3274& 0.3258& 0.3323& 0.3684& 0.4045& 0.3540&
&
Number&of&countries&
&
132&
&
132&
&
132&
&
132&
&
132&
&
155&
&
132&
&
132&
&
132&
&
132&
&
Data&retrieved&from&the&VSDem&dataset&(Coppedge&et&al.,&2016b)&and&the&QoG&dataset&(Dahlberg,&2017).&
Robust&standard&errors&in&parentheses&
***&p<0.01,&**&p<0.05,&*&p<0.1&
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The indicators of the equal distribution of resources index presents mixed results 
on their influence on democracy level. Both the public spending and the universal welfare 
coefficient have a positive effect on the polity score. This is however contradicting the theory 
which stated that a larger spending on public goods and a more universal welfare should be 
associated with less democracy since the people do not have any need for a redistributive 
democratic government. The results of these two coefficients leads me to reject hypothesis H4a, 
which said that more public goods spending and more universal welfare systems should have 
negative effect on democracy level.  
The educational and health indicators coefficients have a positive effect on 
democracy level. This coefficient is in line with the theoretical argument presented but, since 
the coefficients are not statistical significant, I am rejecting both hypothesis H5a and H6a, 
which said that lower educational inequality and lower health inequality should have a positive 
effect on democracy level.  
The coefficients for power distributed by socioeconomic group, social group and 
gender are all positive and significant. These findings are in line with the theoretical arguments 
made and indicate that a more equal distribution of power between socioeconomic groups, 
social groups and between the genders are associated with a higher level of democracy.  These 
results lead me to confirm hypothesizes H7a and H8a, which said that more unequal distribution 
between social groups, socioeconomic groups and genders should be associated with lower 
levels of democracy.  
In all of the models in table 6, and like the results in table 4 and 5, are the only 
other significant coefficients educational Gini and democracy in the region. 
 The results show that more spending on public goods is associated with a higher 
democracy level. This could have to do with for example better roads with allows people to 
have the chance to participate more and therefore might lead to a higher democracy level. The 
same could be with universal healthcare, where a larger public healthcare leads to a higher 
number of healthy people, which leads to more democratic participation and therefore a higher 
democracy level. The results of the power variables3 clearly shows that power distribution in a 
society is important for the level of democracy. A society where all groups of people have more 
equal power clearly has a higher level of democracy.  
 Both the spending on public goods variable and the universal healthcare indicator 
can lead to an increase in the institutions where citizens can express their alternative 
                                                
3 Power by socioeconomic position, power by social group and power by gender 
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preferences, which is one of the parts of the Polity measurement of democracy. A higher value 
on the power variables could affect the democracy variables via the guarantee of civil liberties 
to all citizen’s part of democracy.  
!
6.3!Effect!sizes!!!
Graph 1 shows the different effect sizes of the coefficients of the independent variables. From 
this graph I conclude that the egalitarian democracy index and the equal distribution of 
resources index has the largest effects on the polity score. The equal distribution of resources 
index has about half of the polity score scale effect. This means that a change by one to a more 
equal distribution of resources society changes the polity score by 10 points, which is half of 
its scale.  
I furthermore conclude that out of the equal distribution of resources indicators, 
has power by social group, power by gender and power by socioeconomic group the largest 
effect on democracy level.  A change by one in any of these indicators changes the polity score 
by a couple of points which still can be argued to be a large change for a 20-point scale.  
Education inequality has been investigated by other researches and it seems like, 
even though significant, it does not have any large substantial effect.  
 
Graph!1.!Effect!size!!
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6.4!Analysis!of!the!effect!over!time!!
This section of my analysis present the results of the over-time effect of the different 
independent variables on democracy level. Each point in the graphs represent a regression 
where the corresponding lag of the inequality measurement has been used as the independent 
variable. The point in the graph is the value of the coefficient for this lag and the line 
surrounding it is the standard error. If the line is fully above or below the 0 line is the coefficient 
for the regression statistically significant. The regressions are based on the same data as all the 
previous regressions. 
 
 
Graph!2.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Gini!coefficient!variable!on!democracy!level.!
 
 
As has been previously shown in Table 4 the Gini coefficient has no immediate effect on 
democracy level. This result goes against the theoretical arguments made by Boix (2003) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), but are in line with theory by Ansell and Samuels (2010). 
However, Graph 2 show that Gini has a significantly positive lagged effect of about 10-17 years. 
The significantly positive effect of the Gini coefficient on the polity score is against the theories 
by Boix (2003).  These results mean that the Gini score of a country for 10-17 years back in 
time has a positive effect on democracy level, meaning that a more unequal society 10-17 years 
back is associated with a higher democracy level today.  
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The results in Graph 2 lead me to reject hypothesis H1c which said that economic 
inequality should have a long-term negative effect on the democracy level.  
The results in Graph 2 could confirm the theory by Ansell and Samuels (2010), 
that the fear of expropriation of assets by the elite amongst the rich in highly unequal societies 
drives a push for democracy. My results however show that this process takes between 10-17 
years, something that has not been investigated before.  
My results show that the assumed stickiness of the effect of the Gini coefficient 
is missing and the use of the Gini coefficient from different points in time can be problematic 
since the effect of the Gini coefficient on democracy level is changing depending on from when 
you use the Gini coefficient.  My results show that the assumption of inequality not changing 
over the past 20 years (Bollen and Jackman, 1985) is wrong and that the effect of inequality is 
different depending on from when the measurement is used.  
 
 
Graph!3.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Family!farms!variable!on!democracy!level.!
 
 
Graph 3 show that the lagged family farm measurement of inequality has no systematic effect 
on democracy level. These result goes against the theoretical arguments made by Ansell and 
Samuels (2010) and the results found by them.  
There is no clear trajectory and there is only at some points in time that percent 
of family farms has an effect on democracy level. There is a significant effect for lag 29 and 
30, this suggest that if there were a more equal society 29-30 years ago is this associated with 
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a significantly higher democracy level. These results suggest that it takes 30 years for equality 
to have an effect on democracy level. The results in Graph 3 suggest that mechanism described 
in the theory by Ansell and Samuels (2010), that the landholders want representation to avoid 
expropriation, takes 30 years to get have an effect.   
I, based on the results in Graph 3, reject hypothesis H2d which said that the effect 
of land inequality should be long term. This since I find no systematic significant effects of 
land inequality. 
 
Graph!4.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Egalitarian!democracy!index!variable!on!democracy!level.!
 
 
The initial positive and significant coefficient in Graph 4 indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between the egalitarian democracy index and the democracy level, meaning that a 
higher value on the egalitarian democracy index is associated with a higher democracy level. 
These results are in line with the theoretical arguments made by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 2006). However, are the results against the theoretical argument 
presented by Ansell and Samuels (2010). This egalitarian index is significant for around 10 
years back in time. A positive 10-year lag can be interpreted as a higher value on egalitarian 
democracy up until 10 years ago has a positive effect on the democracy level today.  
 The results in Graph 4 contradict the results in Graph 2, where economic 
inequality only had a positive effect around ten years back in time but not otherwise. In Graph 
4 the effect is positive for around 9 years back in time and then has a negative effect over 45 
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years back in time. For around lag 47 and onwards is the effect significantly negative, a result 
that is against the theory by Boix (2003) but in line with the theory by Ansell and Samuels 
(2010). Hypothesis H3c said that a more equal society, a higher value on the egalitarian 
democracy index, should be associated with a long time positive effect on democracy level. I 
reject hypothesis H3c since lag 47 and onwards shows a negative effect of a more equal society 
on democracy level.  
One concern that needs to be repeated is the close correlation between the 
egalitarian democracy index and the polity variable, see Appendix B.  
!
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Graph!5.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Equal!distribution!of!resources!index!variable!on!democracy!
level.!
 
 
!
Graph 5 shows a positive coefficient on the equal distribution of resources index variable which 
indicates a positive relationship, meaning that a higher equal distribution of resources level is 
associated with a higher polity measurement of democracy. These results are in line with the 
theoretical arguments by Boix (2003) and partly by Acemuglu and Robinson (2000, 2001 and 
2006). The coefficients are significant for around three years back in time, meaning that a higher 
equal distribution of resources variable three years back is associated with a higher level of 
democracy today. The graph then shows a slowly moving downward trajectory, where the effect 
is slowly decreasing.  
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For around lag 53 and onwards is the effect significantly negative, this is results 
that is against theory, and would indicate that a higher value on the equal distribution of 
resources index (a more equal society) 50 years ago would be associated with a lower 
democracy level today.  I therefore reject hypothesis H3c which hypothesized a long time 
effect.  
 
 
 
Graph!6.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Particularistic!or!public!goods!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
 
The results in Graph 6 suggest a significant positive relationship between particularistic or 
public goods and democracy level for 1-3 years back in time. A higher public goods spending 
is associated with a higher democracy level. This is not in line with the theory presented in the 
theory chapter where I argue that a higher spending on public goods should stop the want for 
democracy and redistribution.  I hypothesized that there would be a short term negative effect 
on the lagged particularistic or public goods variable. Since my results clearly show a short 
term positive effect I can reject hypothesis H4b, which said that there should be a long term 
negative effect of the particularistic or public goods indicator on democracy level.  
 The graph suggests that spending on public goods has two effects on democracy 
level, one positive immediate effect and one that takes a longer time to have an effect.  
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Graph!7.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Universal!welfare!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
 
Graph 7 show that the universal welfare variable does not seem to have any significant effect 
on democracy level for any point in time. This in not in line with the theory presented in the 
theory chapter. I there theorized that there should be a negative relationship between a universal 
welfare and democracy level, this since people with an already universal welfare have no need 
for democracy.  
 I reject hypothesis H4b (explained above) based on the results presented in Graph 
7. My results suggest that universal welfare has no effect in the level of democracy in the past.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
La
g 
1
La
g 
2
La
g 
3
La
g 
4
La
g 
5
La
g 
6
La
g 
7
La
g 
8
La
g 
9
La
g 
10
La
g 
11
La
g 
12
La
g 
13
La
g 
14
La
g 
15
La
g 
16
La
g 
17
La
g 
18
La
g 
19
La
g 
20
La
g 
21
La
g 
22
La
g 
23
La
g 
24
La
g 
25
La
g 
26
La
g 
27
La
g 
28
La
g 
29
La
g 
30
La
g 
31
La
g 
32
La
g 
33
La
g 
34
La
g 
35
La
g 
36
La
g 
37
La
g 
38
La
g 
39
La
g 
40
La
g 
41
La
g 
42
La
g 
43
La
g 
44
La
g 
45
La
g 
46
La
g 
47
La
g 
48
La
g 
49
La
g 
50
La
g 
51
La
g 
52
La
g 
53
La
g 
54
La
g 
55
La
g 
56
La
g 
57
La
g 
58
La
g 
59
La
g 
60
46!
Graph!8.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!unequal!education!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
!
!
Graph 8 display the effect of the lagged variable unequal education on the democracy level. I 
can in Graph 8 see that unequal education have no significant effect on democracy level. The 
theory chapter presented results by Castello-Climent (2008) who found unequal education to 
have a negative effect on democracy level. Castello-Climent (2008) used the measurement of 
education inequality for five years prior and I therefore hypothesized that the effect would be 
significant five years back in time. However, the results found in Graph 8 leads me to reject 
hypothesis H5b which said that there should be a negative effect for at least five years’ back in 
time of educational inequality on democracy level. These results are surprising given the 
findings by Castello-Climent (2008). 
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Graph!9.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!unequal!health!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
!
 
As shown in Graph 9 has the unequal health variable no immediate or short-term effect on 
democracy level. From lag 40 and onwards is the coefficient negative, indicating a negative 
relationship; where higher health equality is associated with a lower democracy level. Any 
theoretical relationship between health inequality and democracy level and the lagged effects 
was hard to find. However, I theorized that there ought to have been a positive relationship with 
higher health equality is associated with a higher democracy level.  
The over time-effect was hypothesized to have a long term positive effect, where 
higher health equality is associated with a higher democracy level. Based on the results in Graph 
9 I reject hypothesis H6b which said that there ought to be a long-term positive effect of higher 
health equality on democracy level.  
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Graph!10.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Power!by!Socioeconomic!group!variable!on!democracy!
level.!
!
!
 
Graph 10 shows a positive relationship between the power by socioeconomic group variable 
and the democracy level variable. This positive relationship means that higher equal power 
distribution among socioeconomic positions is associated with higher polity democracy. This 
is in line with the theory by for example Vahanen (2003). The results are significant for around 
5 years back in time meaning that a higher equal power distribution among socioeconomic 
positions five years ago is associated with higher polity democracy today. Hypotheses H7b read 
that there should be a long negative lagged effect of power by socioeconomic group on 
democracy level. I reject hypothesis H7b since I do not find a long lagged positive effect of 
more equal power by socioeconomic group on democracy level.  
 Perhaps could this indicator be an alternative measurement to the Gini coefficient 
since it catches some aspects of economic inequality. The steady downward trajectory would 
then indicate that economic inequality has a short term effect but then seizes to play an 
important role for democracy the level.  
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Graph!11.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Power!by!social!group!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
!
 
As shown in Graph 11 is there a positive relationship between power by social group and 
democracy level, this means that higher equal distribution of power between social groups is 
associated with higher polity democracy. This result is in line with the theoretical argument 
presented in the theory chapter. The results in Graph 11 show that this indicator is positive and 
significant for around 10 years back in time. For around lag 55 and onwards is the effect 
significantly negative, which is against the theoretical argument made in this master’s thesis. 
Even though the theoretical argument is the same for this indicator and the previous indicator 
of power by socioeconomic position are the results different when it comes to the lagged effects. 
The power by social group indicator have seems to have a longer stickiness in its effect on 
democracy level, meaning that even the result on the variable 10 years ago has an effect today.  
 Just as for the previous indicator was it hypothesized that there should be a long 
term positive effect. I reject hypothesis H7b since no long term effect is found.  
An interesting result is that, compared to power by socioeconomic group, the 
power by social group has a longer effect on democracy level where it continues to have a 
significant effect for 11 years whilst the power by socioeconomic group only has a significant 
effect for 3-4 years. 
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Graph!12.!The!effect!of!the!lagged!Power!by!Gender!variable!on!democracy!level.!
!
!
 
Graph 12 shows the lagged effect of the power by gender variable on democracy level. As can 
be seen in Graph 12 is this a positive relationship, this means that higher equal distribution of 
power between the genders is associated with higher polity democracy. These results are in line 
with the theory by Inglehart et al. (2002). The results are significant and positive for around 3 
years back in time meaning that a high level of power between gender three years back is 
associated with a higher level of democracy.  The hypothesis formulated in the theory chapter 
read that there should be an immediate effect of the power by gender variable on democracy 
level. I confirm hypothesis H8b since the effect is only significant for around three years back. 
Graph 12 thereby confirms the theory that more gender equality and democracy more or less 
occur at the same time.  
It is interesting to compare this power distribution variable to the other two power 
distribution variables. The power distribution by gender is the only one the power variables that 
only has an immediate effect on democracy level and not any longer effect. This seems to 
indicate that the power distribution by gender has a different way of effecting democracy levels 
compared to the other power distribution variables.  
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7! Conclusions,!concerns!and!suggestions!for!further!research!!
The research question that I set out to answer in my master’s thesis was: does inequality effect 
democracy? To answer this research question were three purposes formulated; first to test 
competing established theories on the relationship between inequality and democracy, this since 
previous studies have failed to come to any consensus on the relationship. Second, to introduce 
an alternative operationalization of inequality, this because the quality of the data on previously 
used variables has been widely questioned. Finally, to investigate the effect of inequality on 
democracy over time, this because it is an aspect that has been missing in previous research.  
 The main conclusion that I draw from my results is that I find no support for the 
recognized theories of any relationship between the established ways on operationalizing 
inequality, using the Gini coefficient and percent of family farms, and democracy. However, 
when I use the alternative way of operationalizing inequality I do find a relationship in line with 
the established theory by Boix (2003). I thereby conclude that this alternative way of measuring 
inequality might be a good alternative way of measuring inequality. The use of this alternative 
measurement helps to understand the relationship between inequality and democracy but it 
could also be useful for other fields of research that investigate the effects of inequality. I also 
conclude that inequality has changing effects on democracy over time. This result proofs that 
we cannot look at inequality as a static variable that does not change but need to see that 
inequality has changing effects over time.  
 The short answer to my research question is therefor, yes inequality seems to 
affect democracy but how and when depends on how inequality is measured.  
 
7.1!Conclusions!on!the!different!purposes!
The first purpose of my study is based on the numerous theories of the existence or not of a 
relationship between inequality and democracy. The literature review divides the previous 
literature into three groups; the authors who find no relationship between inequality and 
democracy; the authors that find a negative relationship and, finally; the authors that finds a 
more complex relationship between inequality and democracy. In order to be able to answer 
the question of which theory in the literature that best explain the relationship I used a time 
series cross section regression model with fixed effects and clustered standard errors. I use this 
type of regression model since the data is in a time series form.  
Boix (2003) presents a theory where high economic inequality should have a 
negative impact on democracy. I test this theory by using the above described model. The 
52!
results from the analysis, see Table 4, shows that the Gini coefficient, which is a measurement 
of income inequality, had no significant relationship with democracy level. These results are in 
oppositions to what has been found and argued by for example Boix (2003). However, are my 
results in line with the findings in the studies by Haggard and Kaufman (2012) and Teorell 
(2010) where no relationship is found.  
Ansell and Samuels (2010) argues that different types of inequality, land 
inequality and economic inequality, affect democracy in different ways. I therefore test if land 
inequality and economic inequality has different effects on democracy level. The results, found 
in Table 4 and 5, show that neither economic inequality, operationalized as the Gini coefficient 
or land inequality, operationalized by the percent of family farms variable, has any significant 
effect on democracy level.  
The final theory to be tested in this master’s thesis is the relationship between 
inequality and democracy presented by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Burkheart (1997). 
According to these authors should the relationship between inequality and democracy be an 
inverted U-shape. To test this theory are squared variables of the Gini coefficient and the family 
farms variable used as independent variables. The results, found in Table 4 and 5, show that 
neither of these variables have any significant effect on democracy level. 
Based on these results I conclude that neither of the established theories of a 
relationship between inequality and democracy in the literature holds according to my study. 
The group of literature that seems to be the most accurately describing the relationship are the 
studies by for example Teorell (2010), Haggard and Kaufman (2012), and Houle (2009) that 
finds no relationship between inequality and democracy.   
The reason for the null finding of a relationship between inequality and 
democracy level could have to do with the limited data on the independent variables, the Gini 
coefficients and the family farms measurement. Studies by Houle (2009) have argued that the 
data on inequality have serious flaws and perhaps is this also the case for my study. For 
example, is the family farm variables only containing 666 observations. A way to solve this 
data limitation could be to further interpolate the variable to increase the number of 
observations, something that however, would mean creating a large amount of the data. To 
draw conclusions based on manufactured data is perhaps just as bad as having little data to 
begin with.  
Another possible way to deal with the data limitation on inequality is to find an 
alternative way of measuring inequality, one where data is widely available and there is 
transparency on how it has been collected. This is the reason behind the second purpose of my 
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thesis, to introduce an alternative measurement of inequality. I choose to use the V-Dem 
egalitarian democracy index since this and the subcomponent index, the equal distribution of 
resources index, measures if several resources in society are equally distributed. I construct 
new theoretical arguments behind why and how these indexes and the indicators that make up 
the indexes should be associated with the democracy level and I formulate testable hypothesizes 
based on these theoretical arguments. The results in Table 6 show that the egalitarian 
democracy index has a significant effect on democracy level. The egalitarian distribution of 
resources index also has a significant effect on democracy level. Both these indexes have a 
positive effect, which is what would have been expected according to theories by Boix (2003). 
However, as I discussed in the analysis and results chapter might this large result be an effect 
of a correlation between the indexes and the measurement of democracy level.  
I used the indicators that make up the equal distribution of resources index as 
independent variables due to this concern of a high correlation between the measurements. My 
results show that the majority of the indicators had a significant effect on democracy level. 
Universal healthcare and public spending had a significantly positive effect on democracy 
level. The hypothesis was however that the effect would be negative since the want for 
democracy would be smaller when people have universal healthcare and a large public 
spending. The indicators of power by socioeconomic group, power by social group and power 
by gender all had a significantly positive effect on democracy level. Which is in line with the 
theoretical prediction and the hypothesizes.  
I conclude that some of the V-Dem indicators, for example the equal distribution 
of resources index and the indicators of power by socioeconomic group, power by social group 
and power by gender, could be used as a measurement of inequality. To use the V-Dem 
indicators as established measurements of inequality would come with the befits of being both 
highly reliable and containing a complete dataset with most country-years available.  
The final purpose of my thesis was to investigate the effect of inequality on 
democracy level over time. Teorell (2010, p. 155) points out that most studies have investigated 
the effect of inequality on democracy on a very long or a very short time frame. Teorell (ibid) 
raises the need for a study that investigates the intermediate time frame. My study picks up on 
this question and investigate the effect of inequality on democracy over time by using the lagged 
effect of all the previously discussed measurement of inequality. I further motivated this 
investigation over time since previous studies assumed inequality be not change over time and 
thereby had measurement at different points in time been used (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). 
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I use lagged variables of the different operationalization’s of inequality as 
independent variables since I then can investigate if they have a significant effect on democracy 
level. The results can be found in Graphs 2-11.  
I find that the measurements of inequality have different effects over time. For 
example, has the Gini coefficient no immediate effect on democracy level, but it has a positive 
significant effect after 10 years. The family farms measurement of inequality however, barely 
has any significant effect on democracy level at any point in time. The egalitarian democracy 
index and its subcomponents and indicators all show different patterns of the effect on 
democracy level over time. From these results I conclude that the use of lags illustrate that 
inequality has very changing effects on democracy levels over time, an idea that has not been 
explored in previous studies but that needs to be explored further in future research.   
 
7.2!Concerns!!!!!
One of the larger challenges with the research field on democratization is the potential 
bidirectional nature of the relationship between the dependent variable, democracy, and the 
independent variables. My thesis as well face this challenge since it is possible that democracy 
affect inequality level and inequality affect the level of democracy. This means that even though 
I find some significant effects of inequality on democracy I cannot say that I have found 
inequality to be a cause of democracy. However, I can conclude and contribute with that some 
operationalization’s of inequality has the significant effect on democracy as established theory 
predict, but I cannot say that increased inequality causes democracy levels to increase.  
 Another challenge with my study is of a pure methodological nature. I chose to 
use a time series cross section regression model with fixed effect since this model had been 
used in other studies working with the V-Dem data. I furthermore argued in favor of a fixed 
effect model since this model allows the unobserved effect to be correlated within units of 
observation, here countries (Fortin-Rittberger 2015; p. 396). It is realistic to assume that there 
are some omitted variables that are specific to the units and that these varies between the units. 
However, it would be a good idea for future research to perform a Hausman test to statistically 
determine if a fixed effects model or a random effects model should be used (Fortin-Rittberger 
2015; p. 396). One problem with the fixed effect model is the loss of degrees of freedom and 
efficiency in the model.  
Further suggestions for similar studies would be to use panel corrected standard 
errors to deal with problems such as panel heteroskedasticity or contemporarily correlated 
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errors in the data (Fortin-Rittberger 2015; p. 397). It would also be useful for future research to 
include a lag of the dependent variable in order to deal with any serial correlation in the data 
(Fortin-Rittberger 2015; p. 392).  
 
7.3!Suggestions!for!further!research!!
The link between inequality and democracy has been explored in many papers, books and also 
in this master’s thesis. There are however still many gaps that could be explored by future 
research. One suggestion for future research is to try to establish the causal mechanism to 
properly deal with the reversed causality issue. To prove a causal link between inequality and 
democracy was not the purpose of this master’s thesis, but it is still a topic that I think needs to 
be more investigated to further understand the link between inequality and democracy.  To 
investigate the causal direction of the relationship between inequality and democracy could 
perhaps an instrumental variable approach be used. However, what to use as an instrumental 
variable be remains to be explored by future research.   
 Another idea for future research is to explore different measurements of 
democracy to see if the way of operationalizing and measuring democracy has any effect on 
the results. It would furthermore be interesting to investigate a longer time period since it then 
would catch the different waves of democratization. Perhaps is inequality effecting the different 
waves of democratization in dissimilar ways.  
Like previously discussed is another possible way forward to develop some of the 
V-Dem indicators into established alternative measurement of inequality.  This would however 
require a validation of the V-Dem indexes, perhaps by using them in order to test well-known 
relationships with inequality. If the V-Dem indicators produce similar results as other 
measurements, but with the benefits of widely available and complete data, could this be seen 
as a validation of using the V-Dem indicators as a measurement on inequality.   
 
7.4!Concluding!remarks!!
The results from my thesis does not only contribute to the research field of democracy and 
inequality but as well has external use. Thru my thesis can policy makers and people outside 
academia further understand what effects the level of democracy in countries. The results of 
my master’s thesis can lead to new ideas on how to promote democracy by for example ensuring 
an equal distribution of power between socioeconomic groups, social groups and gender.  
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 My results of the possibility to use an alternative measurement of inequality can 
as well be beneficial for policy makers and other actors since the trouble of measuring 
inequality as well is a problem outside academia.  
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Appendix!A!
 
Table!1.!Table!of!the!papers!included!in!the!literature!review.!!
 
Study& Inequality&data& Method& Effect&of&inequality& Inequality&different&
effect&over&time&
Bollen&and&Jackman&&
(1985)&
&
Income!quintiles!
(World!Bank,!N60)!!
Weighted!2SLS!!
!
None!!
!
No,!but!the!
measurement!for!
inequality!is!assumed!
to!not!change!over!
time!!
!
Muller&(1988)&& Income!Gini,!income!
quintiles!(World!Bank,!
N33)!
Bivariate!reg.!! None!
democratization,!
negative!
consolidation!!
No,!but!the!
measurement!for!
inequality!is!assumed!
to!not!change!over!
time!!
!
Bollen&and&Jackman&
(1995)&
&
Income!quintiles!
(World!Bank,!N60)!
OLS,!robust!
regression!and!
median!regression!
None!! No,!but!the!
measurement!for!
inequality!is!assumed!
to!not!change!over!
time!!
!
Fish&and&Choudhry&
(2007)&
&
Gini!coefficient,!
change!in!Gini!
(Various!sources,!N!
151Z162)!
!
EngleZGranger!
analysis!!
None! No!
Houle&(2009)&
&
Capitals!share!of!
income!in!
manufacturing!sector!
(Ortega!&!Rodriguez,!
N!30439Z4029)!
!
Dynamic!probit! None! Inequality!is!lagged!
one!year!
Teorell&(2010)&
&
Gini!(Galbrait!and!
Kum,!N)!
! None! Inequality!is!lagged!
one!year!
!
Haggard&and&
Kaufman&(2012)&
&
Land!inequality!
(Vahanaen)!Gini!(EHII)!
(N!86)!
Causal!process!
observation!
None!! No!
Muller!(1995)!A!and!B! Income&Gini,&income&
quintiles&(World&Bank,&
N64)&
OLS& Negative& Inequality&is&lagged&
one&year&
&
Feng&and&Zak&(1999)&
&
Income!distribution!
(D&S!N680)!
Survival!analysis! Negative! No!
Zak&and&Feng&(2003)&
&
Theoretical!paper! ! Negative! No!
Barro&(1999)&& Income!Gini!income!
quintiles!(D&S,!N303)!!
Seemingly!unrelated!
reg.!(SUR)!!
Negative!!
!
No!
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Boix&(2003)&&
&
Income!Gini!(D&S,!
N1042)!%!family!
farms!!
!
Dynamic!probit!!
!
Negative! !
Ziblatt&(2009)&
&
Land!inequality!
(N4272)!
!
Time!series!crossZ
sectional!regression!
Negative!! No!
Acemoglu&and&
Robinson&(2000,&2001&
and&2006)&
&
Theoretical!papers!
and!case!studies!
Only!theoretical!
paper!and!case!
studies!
Inverted!UZshape!! No!
Burkhart&(1997)& Income!quintiles!
(World!Bank,!N224)!!
!
2SLS!
!
Inverted!UZshape!
!
No!
Ansell&and&Samuels&
(2008)&
Income!Gini!!(B&M,!
N4728)!!%!family!
farms!!
!
Dynamic!probit!! positive!(income)!
negative!(land)!!
Gini!from!20!years!
ago!is!used!as!
instrumental!variableZ!
but!then!disregarded!
Midlarsky&(1992)&& Land!Gini!(N72)!agric.!
density!(N97)!Income!
quintiles!(World!Bank,!
N55)!
!
OLS! Positive!(land)!none!
(income)!!
No!
Perotti&(1996)&
&
Income!quintiles!(Jain!
and!Lecaillon!et!al.,!N!
49)!
ReducedZform!
regression!
Income!inequality!
associated!with!less!
political!stability!!
No!
Alesina&and&Perotti&
(1996)&
&
Income!quintiles!(Jain!
and!Lecaillon!et!
al.,N71)!
!
2SLS! Income!inequality!
leads!to!social!
discontent!!
No!
Dutt&and&Mitra&(2008)&
&
Income!quintiles!
(World!bank!and!
Dollar!and!Kray,!N!52Z
72!)!
!
OLS!and!instrumental!
variable!regression!
Income!inequality!
leads!political!
volatility!
No,!Gini!is!averaged!
over!the!time!period!
of!1960Z2000!
!
Rueda&and&
Stegmueller&(2016)&
&
Regional!Gini!
coefficient!(European!
Social!Survey!(ESS)!,N!
129)!
Maximum!likelihood! Higher!income!
inequality!leads!to!
preference!for!
redistribution!!
No!
!
Table!based!on!Houle!(2009),!with!supplements!!
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Correlation!matrix!between!all!independent!variables!!
!
 
 
& Polity&& Gini& Family&
farms&
Egalitarian&
democracy&
index&&
Equal&
distribution&
index&&
Particularistic&
or&public&
goods&&
Universal&
welfare&
Educational&
inequality&
Health&
inequality&
Power&by&
socioeconomic&
group&
Power&
by&
social&
group&&
Power&
by&
gender&
&
Polity&
&
!
1!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Gini&
&
Z
0.1202!
!
1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Family&
Farms&
&
0.3546! Z
0.2752!
1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Egalitarian&
democracy&
index&&
&
0.7934! Z
0.3076!
0.4775! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Equal&
distribution&
index&&
&
0.5185! Z
0.4236!
0.3768! 0.8201! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Particularistic&
or&public&
goods&&
0.4338! Z
0.2975!
0.3732! 0.6985! 0.7793! 1! ! ! ! ! ! !
Universal&
welfare&
&
0.2240! Z
0.2620!
0.1643! 0.4733! 0.6824! 0.6704! 1! ! ! ! ! !
Educational&
inequality&
&
0.4184! Z
0.4630!
0.3818! 0.7400! 0.8990! 0.6018! 0.5342! 1! ! ! ! !
Health&
inequality&
&
0.4869! Z
0.4210!
0.3939! 0.7841! 0.9349! 0.6893! 0.5969! 0.8963! 1! ! ! !
Power&by&
socioeconomic&
group&
&
0.4170! Z
0.4183!
0.3448! 0.6599! 0.8190! 0.6836! 0.5859! 0.6643! 0.6866! 1! ! !
Power&by&
social&group&&
&
0.5608! Z
0.2755!
0.3895! 0.7554! 0.7117! 0.5490! 0.3738! 0.5940! 0.6069! 0.6109! 1! !
Power&by&
gender&
&
0.4812! Z
0.3663!!
0.3438! 0.6552! 0.7176! 0.5896! 0.5460! 0.5832! 0.6083! 0.6640! 0.6395! 1!
